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The nature of crime is changing — estimates suggest that at least half of all crime is now 
committed online.  Once everyday objects (e.g. televisions, baby monitors, door locks) that 
are now internet connected, collectively referred to as the Internet of Things (IoT), have the 
potential to transform society, but this increase in connectivity may generate new crime 
opportunities. Here, we conducted a systematic review to inform understanding of these 
risks. We identify a number of high-level mechanisms through which offenders may exploit 
the consumer IoT including profiling, physical access control and the control of device 
audio/visual outputs. The types of crimes identified that could be facilitated by the IoT were 
wide ranging and included burglary, stalking, and sex crimes through to state level crimes 
including political subjugation. Our review suggests that the IoT presents substantial new 
opportunities for offending and intervention is needed now to prevent an IoT crime harvest.  




The “Internet of Things (IoT)” refers to electronic devices that are internet connected and 
can communicate and interact with one another (e.g. Maple, 2017). The IoT is considered 
the next technological revolution, and in the home, products can range from smart locks, to 
home assistants which afford greater convenience and intelligent living. Currently, it is 
estimated that the average UK household has ten internet connected products.  This is 
expected to rise to 15 by 2020 (Wrap, 2017). However, consumer adoption of IoT products 
is lagging behind predictions, largely due to privacy and security concerns (DCMS, 2018).  In 
this article, we systematically review crimes that have or may be facilitated by the consumer 
IoT.  We begin by explaining why we might expect the IoT to facilitate crime and specify 
what types of devices we are concerned with.  We then discuss the approach taken to 
review the literature and present our findings. 
Crime Harvests and the IoT 
It is well documented (e.g. Felson, 1994) that many new products and services have led to 
“crime harvests” (Pease, 1997). These arise when insufficient attention is given to the crime 
and security implications of new products and services which become prevalent in the 
legitimate market.  Considering the evolution of a product or service, these have a lifecycle 
which involves four stages: (1) an introduction phase, where use is limited to early adopters; 
(2) a growth stage in which uptake increases; (3) a maturity stage in which the mass market 




Crime harvests can take different forms.  In the case of the theft of physical products, this 
tends to occur during the growth and mass market stages of the product lifecycle. During 
these stages, products are well-known, desirable and sufficiently abundant to make 
locating/stealing them easy and their sale inconspicuous. Crime harvests have played out 
many times. Traditional urban examples include vehicle theft in the 1990s (e.g. Laycock, 
2004), and mobile phone theft in the noughties (e.g. Mailley, Garcia, Whitehead, & Farrell, 
2008). In these, and similar examples, solutions were found — albeit retrospectively — but 
offenders had exploited vulnerabilities in the design of these products for a considerable 
amount of time, in some cases decades, before they were addressed.   
 
In the case of physical theft, crime opportunities may reduce with market saturation, since 
few people will want to buy stolen items at this point.  However, for many goods, 
particularly electronic and (say) automotive ones, manufacturers constantly develop them 
to increase functionality and sales.  Moreover, goods can be exported to countries where 
market saturation has not occurred.  Consequently, opportunities for theft will not always 
decline with market penetration. 
 
Online, crime opportunities are not limited to the theft of purchased products and so are 
even less likely to decline.  Instead, opportunities will be proportional to the number of 
people using a service.  For example, the introduction of email has allowed fraudsters to 
adopt “needle in a haystack” approaches – such as phishing scams (Hong, 2012) – to steal 
(say) victim’s financial data.   With such scams, victims are sent emails from seemingly (but 
not) genuine sources (e.g. a bank) that include a link to website.  If they click on the link, 
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they are directed to a malicious website and asked to provide sensitive information, 
including their username, password, or bank details.  In this case, as the adoption of email 
services increases, so does the number of crime opportunities.   
 
Recent estimates from the Crime Survey of England and Wales (Office for National Statistics, 
2017b) suggest that at least half of all crime is now online.  This is likely to be an 
underestimate because only a handful of incidents of computer misuse are covered in the 
survey, and victims will often be unaware that they have been victimised. However, what 
these figures clearly illustrate is that the opportunities afforded by the internet are being 
exploited. 
 
As noted, the market penetration of IoT devices is increasing.   As it grows, crime harvests 
may emerge and, because different types of devices offer different functions, the potential 
forms these crime harvests may take may increase.  Unlike crime in the “real” world, the IoT 
may facilitate the commission of crime at low cost, at scale and across geographic 
boundaries.  
 
Warning signs of a crime harvest for IoT devices already exist. In 2016, attackers exploited 
hundreds of thousands of internet-connected cameras and Video Recorders, taking 
advantage of their poor security to build networks of compromised internet connected 
devices. These botnets were then used to launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks, which involve sending massive volumes of requests to online services that, unable 
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to cope with the demand, become inoperable.  The 2016 attacks, which used the Mirai 
malware to target servers operated by DYN in the U.S., disrupted online services such as 
Twitter and Netflix, and were particularly interesting because they represent the first known 
attack that used compromised IoT devices (as opposed to infected computers).  At this time, 
the volume and types of incidents of crime that have involved IoT devices are limited.  
However, rather than wait for another crime harvest, the aim of the current article is to 
draw the issue to the attention of the criminological and related communities, and to take 
stock of what we already know.  To do this, we provide a synthesis of the literature on crime 
that might be facilitated by the IoT.  Before presenting findings, we define what is within 
scope for the review – including what mean by the IoT in the context of this article – and 
briefly articulate the methodological approach taken. 
 
The IoT is transformative and spans across multiple domains. Here, we focus specifically on 
consumer (as opposed to, say, industrial) IoT devices, which may be defined as once 
everyday objects found around the home that are now internet connected (e.g. smart 
speakers or smart doorbells).  For most devices, a connection to the internet is unnecessary 
and there will be non-internet connected variants of them.  As such, we exclude routers, 
smart phones and tablets since these (mostly) require an internet connection to function.  
We also exclude computers (desktops and laptops), because these are very different types 
of devices.  For example, they are high-capacity devices that have been on the market for a 
long time, have well developed operating systems and user interfaces, and the threats to 




We focus on consumer IoT because the cybercrime challenges associated with it are 
prevalent and bring unique risks to consumers’ security, privacy and safety.  Currently, 
consumer IoT devices lack adequate security provision — poor design choices such as 
default passwords, inadequate encryption and lack of software updates have allowed 
consumer IoT devices to be misused for malicious purposes (DCMS, 2018). These have 
arisen in part due to the companies developing IoT devices either lacking expertise in 
security, or paying too little attention to it, and the absence of economic incentives (and 
regulation) to encourage security by design (FTC, 2015).  Furthermore, at present, the most 
prevalent risks associated with insecure IoT devices discussed in the media are DDoS 
attacks.  For these crimes, the direct impact is not generally felt by the consumer or 
manufacturer, but rather third parties (Schneier, 2018), which reduces the incentive for 
manufacturers (and consumers) to take the issue seriously.  
However, in the future, the crime risks associated with consumer IoT have the potential to 
be more wide-ranging, impacting on citizens, companies and nations more directly.  As 
discussed, one reason for this is that as well as increasing in ubiquity, the variety of devices 
that are internet connected – and the actions they are capable of completing – is increasing.  
For example, Smart TVs and speakers not only allow media to be streamed, but for sound, 
conversations and people’s actions to be monitored and recorded. Many IoT devices now 
have actuators (e.g. a lock in a security system), which allow actions to be triggered in the 




With these points in mind, the aims of this paper are to provide a systematic review of 
existing work on cybercrime and the consumer IoT to address the following research 
questions:  
1. What are the primary mechanisms through which cybercrimes may be committed 
using IoT devices? 
2. What cybercrimes have/could be facilitated through consumer IoT devices? 
To be clear, this paper is not about cybercrime in general.  This would be beyond the scope 
of a single article. Instead, our focus is on crimes facilitated by the IoT.  In the tradition of 
situational crime prevention (e.g. Clarke, 1980), it is important to have this clear focus as our 
aim is to understand the crime opportunities the consumer IoT presents with a view to 
catalysing and informing attempts to prevent associated crime harvests.    
 
Evidence Synthesis 
A brief discussion of our approach to the review is important at this point.  We could have 
conducted a standard ad-hoc literature review, but these are known to be problematic, 
primarily because they can lead to the synthesis of a biased sample of articles, often limited 
to those already known to the study authors.  Systematic reviews (Higgins & Green, 2011) 
have emerged as a solution to this.   They involve a systematic and transparent search 
strategy, which includes the a-priori specification of the search terms to be used, databases 
to be searched, and so on.  Consequently, any two authors conducting the search would be 
expected to find the same articles.   
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Systematic reviews are most commonly used to synthesise evidence on what works to 
reduce a problem, such as crime (Weisburd, Farrington and Gill, 2016).  However, they can 
also be used to synthesize the evidence on particular topics (e.g. Cockbain, Bowers and 
Dimitrova, 2018), which is our aim here.   
The specific aim of a systematic review will inform the approach taken to evidence synthesis 
and the types of studies included.  Systematic reviews of what works address questions 
about something that has already happened, and those conducted in the Campbell tradition 
(for a discussion of approaches, see Johnson, Bowers and Tilley, 2015) typically focus on 
experiments that test the impact of interventions.  In reviewing that evidence, researchers 
typically assess the quality of the evidence, as well as the effects observed.  More weight is 
given to high quality studies for which rival explanations for observed effects can be ruled 
out.  Here, the prospective nature of the review presents a methodological challenge. That 
is, it is difficult to assess the strength of the evidence about something yet to happen.  To 
address our research questions, we draw on the findings of studies that employ a range of 
methodologies.  These include expert speculation — commonly used in futures studies —
and laboratory experiments intended to identify vulnerabilities in systems, which is an 
established methodology in the field of information security.  While studies employing these 
approaches cannot demonstrate that an issue will emerge in the “wild”, they speak to its 
plausibility.  To make use of such sources of information, we draw on the realist approach 
(Pawson and Tilley, 2018) to review to identify the potential mechanisms through which IoT 
devices might be exploited in the future to commit crime.  Like systematic reviews 
conducted in the Campbell tradition, we use a hierarchy of evidence to assess the strength 




The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  Next, we describe the methodology 
employed, including a discussion of our search criteria and search strategy. We then provide 
a synthesis of the findings, considering what types of crime have or could be facilitated by 
IoT devices, and how such crimes might be committed (i.e. the mechanism through which 
they are committed).  In the discussion, we draw conclusions and articulate why we think 
the study of crime facilitated by the IoT would benefit from attention from the 
criminological as well as the information security community (who have almost exclusively 
researched this issue to date). 
METHOD 
Systematic review process 
We first developed a review protocol (see Higgins & Green, 2011) that was examined by five 
independent experts.  They commented on the research questions, search strategy, 
inclusion criteria and electronic databases searched.  The protocol was updated on the basis 
of their feedback.  After studies were identified for inclusion, they were read, and the 
findings summarised using a narrative approach. 
Inclusion Criteria 
We included studies that employed any type of research design. All types of information 
sources were included with the exception of articles that were not peer-reviewed or that 
were unavailable in English. We included papers that appeared in the proceedings of 
information security conferences and magazine articles that had been peer reviewed, PhD 
theses and student dissertations. We also included literature reviews, as novel information 
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may have been presented by the authors of those reviews that was relevant to the study, 
but we avoided double counting. Studies were included if they discussed consumer IoT 
devices or smart home platforms.  Studies that discussed other forms of IoT such as smart 
cities, healthcare, or industrial IoT were excluded. Studies were included if there was a 
discussion of a crime, attack or a security-related issue.  In some cases, studies discussed 
specific security solutions or countermeasures — these were only included if there was 
explicit discussion of the type of crime or attack the countermeasure was designed to 
address (studies that discussed solutions to “cybercrime” were excluded).  
Electronic searches 
A search of the following databases was conducted in November 2017: Web of Science, 
ProQuest, ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore Digital Library, and Scopus. We limited searches 
to papers published between 2007 and 2017. The search terms were piloted in order to 
achieve a balance between sensitivity (retrieving a high proportion of relevant articles) and 
specificity (retrieving a low proportion of irrelevant articles), and an academic librarian 
consulted to validate these and the databases used.  The final search terms were: 
“IoT” OR “Internet of Things” OR “internet-connected” OR “cyber-physical” OR 
“M2M” OR “Machine to machine” OR “smart NEAR/3 device*” OR “smart home” OR 
“connected device*” OR “smart wearable” OR SU.EXACT(“Internet of Things”) OR 
SU.EXACT(“Internet of Things”) OR SU.EXACT(“Ubiquitous Computing”) 
AND 
“hack*” OR “risk*” OR “threat*” OR “vulner*” OR “crim*” OR “attack*” OR “exploit” 
OR “security” OR “privacy” OR “bug” OR SU.EXACT(“Crime”) OR SU.EXACT(“Internet 
Crime”) OR SU.EXACT(“Computer Crime”) 
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We also searched for the following subject headings (where allowed by the 
database): SU.EXACT(“Crime”) OR SU.EXACT(“Internet Crime”) OR 
SU.EXACT(“Computer Crime”) 
AND 
"consumer" OR "domestic" OR  "wearable"  OR  "home"  OR “house” 
 
Keywords were searched for in the titles, abstracts and indexed subject headings of articles.  
Data collection and analysis 
Selection of studies 
Identified citations and abstracts were imported into www.covidence.org,  and duplicates 
removed. Studies were screened on title and abstract according to our inclusion criteria. 
One researcher independently screened (i) titles, (ii) abstracts and (iii) full texts against the 
pre-defined eligibility criteria. Random samples of abstracts were screened by a second 
researcher at four stages of the review to assess inter-rater reliability and mitigate coder 
drift (Ratajczyk et al., 2016).  
Inter-rater reliability was calculated using the prevalence- and bias-adjusted kappa (PABAK) 
statistic, which controls for chance agreement (Byrt, Bishop, & Carlin, 1993). The PABAK 
score of 0.78 indicated high inter-rater agreement (see, Higgins & Green, 2011). 
Data extraction and management 
A proforma, piloted on a sample of articles to ensure that relevant information was 




• Year of study 
• Publication type 
• Study design  
• Quality of evidence (see below) 
• Type of evidence (e.g. empirical or simulation) 
• Target of crime, method of offending, cybercrimes/harms 
• Brief description of study  
RESULTS 
Summary of search results 
The initial database search yielded a total of 3506 published articles (see Figure 1).  After 
removing 798 duplicates, 2708 were screened for eligibility — 198 met the inclusion criteria 
for full text review. Following full text review, 114 studies were included.  Of these, two 
were from magazine articles, one was a book chapter, 20 were from journal articles and 91 
were conference proceedings1. Of the 84 excluded, 49 did not discuss a crime-related issue, 
and 29 were not about consumer IoT.  For two, the full text was unavailable, two were not 
peer reviewed, one was a duplicate and one was unavailable in English.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
For urban crimes, specific attack methods are generally associated with some offences but 
not others.  For example, residential burglary may be committed in a variety of ways, but 




1 In computer science, conference papers undergo a rigorous peer-review process. 
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a single method or combination of them, may be used to commit a range of offences. As 
such, unlike urban crime, there will be a less direct mapping between particular methods of 
attack and specific crime types.  Consequently, we first outline the types of attacks 
identified.   Strictly speaking, some of these actions (e.g. Denial of Service attacks) may be 
crimes themselves in many countries, since they violate state laws (e.g. the Computer 
Misuse Act (1990) in the UK).  However, many of these violations may go unnoticed and may 
not in themselves have harmful consequences for the victim.  In the language of realistic 
evaluation (Pawson & Tilley, 2018), they represent intermediate outcomes that are 
necessary steps for a crime to be committed, and hence reviewing their possible forms 
helps to map out what offences might ultimately be possible.  With this in mind, after 
reviewing methods of attack, we outline key mechanisms through which a crime may be 
committed, and the key cybercrimes/harms that have been discussed. This process of attack 
method to cybercrime (ultimate outcome) is summarised in Figure 2.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
We also examine the strength of the evidence to help assess the extent to which the 
offences discussed can be considered plausible.  For example, a particular type of crime is 
considered more likely if it had been demonstrated in the real world compared to 
researchers merely speculating about it.  As with systematic reviews of crime reduction 
interventions, we do this with reference to a hierarchy of evidence.  This was developed 
following an initial reading of the articles and is summarised in Table 1. 




Methods of attack  
A total of eleven attack types were identified which, to ease their presentation and review, 
are summarised in Table 2. These categories are not mutually exclusive, as attackers may 
use multiple techniques to exploit a device or network of them.  As well as listing the types 
of attacks identified, in Table 2 we briefly define them and provide example citations.   
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
While threats exist at the various stages of the development, deployment and lifecycle of a 
product (see, Garcia-Morchon, Kumar, Keoh, Hummen and Struik, 2014), most papers 
focussed on attacks that are launched against purchased IoT devices.  
Mechanisms and cybercrimes/harms 
Next, we detail the key mechanisms that may be employed to facilitate the 
cybercrimes/harms discussed in papers.  We limit discussion to those for which there was 
some consensus in the literature (i.e. examples discussed in two or more papers).  Error! 
Reference source not found. summarises the intermediate outcomes discussed that can be 
realised from the types of attacks shown in Table 2. Error! Reference source not found. 
summarises the cybercrimes/harms. In both tables, we provide an indication of the quality 
of the evidence used to establish the plausibility of the mechanism through which the 
cybercrimes/harms could be realized. 
INSERT TABLE 3 AND TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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We now elaborate on the content of Tables 3 and 4, discussing papers2 that employed 
either an experimental or simulation research design and articulated a clear mechanism 
between an attack method and the associated cybercrimes/harms.  The examples discussed 
thus represent forms of offending for which the way in which an offense might be carried 
out was clearly stated and evidence exists to suggest it as plausible, even if there is little or 
no evidence of this in the “wild” hitherto.  We then discuss how these mechanisms may 
relate to cybercrimes/harms that have been speculatively derived within the literature.  For 
the reader’s benefit, methods of attack (see Table 2) are italicised in the text. 
Exposing personal user data  
Consumer IoT devices can store and process personal data from seemingly innocuous 
information about a users’ activities to personal information (e.g. name and address). 
Numerous studies demonstrate how device vulnerabilities can lead to data being directly 
exposed, raising privacy concerns.  For example, in a laboratory study Lee, Lee, Shim, Cho, 
and Choi, (2016) showed how a number of man-in-the-middle attacks could be used to 
obtain personal information (e.g. personal identifiers and health information) from a 
wearable device. These included exploiting hardware or protocol flaws allowing an 
unauthorized connection to a wearable device to gather personal data illegally. They also 
demonstrated that an attacker can eavesdrop between a wearable device and services to 
intercept data exchanged. Such attacks exploit misconfigurations of Bluetooth settings in 




2 Due to page constraints, only example citations are included in the text.  More details of the full set of papers 
reviewed can be found in the electronic supplementary material. 
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between the real user’s smartphone and an attacker’s) and sensitive data exposure, 
whereby a smartphone application and its firmware do not use encryption to secure data 
(see also, Lotfy and Hale, 2016).  
 
Other research (Tekeoglu & Tosun, 2015a) has explored the security of Chromecast cloud 
communications, finding that the control packets used to send user information can be 
exploited with replay and session hijacking attacks. The exposed data were sent in clear text 
(such as the google account being accessed) to the attacker. Other studies have 
demonstrated that user personal data is sent unencrypted from baby monitors over Wi-Fi 
packets (Sivaraman, Gharakheili, Vishwanath, Boreli, & Mehani, 2015) and can be exposed 
through attacks that target device firmware (Badenhop, Ramsey, Mullins, & Mailloux, 2016).   
 
Attackers may also compromise IoT devices to expose sensitive information not stored on 
them. For example, side channel attacks using smart watches can allow attackers to make 
inferences about sensitive information typed by a user on a smartphone or computer (e.g. 
Maiti, Jadliwala, He, & Bilogrevic, 2015). This is problematic if the user is entering sensitive 
information such as emails, search queries and so on (H. Wang et al., 2015). Research has 
further shown that a malicious app could misuse the gyroscope, accelerometer and 
magnetometer on a smartwatch to infer a user’s ATM PIN with more than 90% accuracy 




The above papers focused on the security of devices tested and on demonstrating the types 
of attack possible.  What they tended not to discuss were the crime types that might be 
facilitated.  For other papers, the reverse was true.  It is to these latter papers we next turn.  
This variability in coverage was common and so this format will be repeated throughout the 
review. In addition, some of the papers that discussed specific crime types provided little 
detail about the offenses themselves.  Conducting a (branching) systematic review of the 
research for each of the crime types discussed was beyond the scope of this review.  
Consequently, following a more realist approach (Pawson and Tilley, 2018), to provide a 
little more detail about the crimes that might be facilitated by IoT devices3, we supplement 
what follows with findings from additional searches. 
 
Directly exposing personal information stored or communicated from IoT devices may lead 
to a number of crimes. Users’ personal information can be used for identity theft (Amin & 
Giacomoni, 2012; Jacobsson, Boldt, & Carlsson, 2016; Tzezana, 2017), by (for example) 
inferring a user’s social security numbers from the information on their wearable (Aktypi, 
Nurse, & Goldsmith, 2017). Sexual-related information or other information such as videos 
and images may be stolen from devices and used to blackmail individuals (Bugeja, 
Jacobsson, & Davidsson, 2017; Tzezana, 2016). The facilitation of theft and distribution of 
sexual content via technology has increased in recent years (Powell & Henry, 2018) and has 




3 To be clear, we only used additional references not identified through the systematic search to provide 
further context about crimes identified through the systematic search.   
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2014, private photos of Jennifer Lawrence and other high-profile celebrities were leaked 
online after hackers exploited their iCloud accounts (BBC news, 2017b).  As more devices 
collect, send and receive such data, the opportunities for such offending will increase. 
Profiling 
Several papers demonstrated that information about consumers’ routine activities (e.g. 
exercise, cooking) and household occupancy can be (in)directly inferred from IoT devices. 
For example, occupancy in the home correlates with smart meter activity relating to power 
usage (Chen, Kalra, Irwin, Shenoy, & Albrecht, 2015). Attackers can obtain activity and 
occupancy information in a number of ways, including eavesdropping communications 
between devices that employ a Bluetooth (Reichherzer, Timm, Earley, Reyes, & Kumar, 
2017) or ZigBee connection (Yoshigoe, Dai, Abramson, & Jacobs, 2016)—both commonly 
used communication protocols in IoT devices. 
 
In a laboratory study, Copos, Levitt, Bishop, and Rowe (2016) analysed the traffic between a 
Nest thermostat and a smoke detector. They found that with high accuracy, they could 
identify when the thermostat transitioned between the Home and Auto Away mode (88%) 
which indicates whether the user is home or not. Other studies have demonstrated how 
variants of side channel attacks can be used to indirectly infer activity patterns (e.g. Anand 
& Saxena, 2016), although the accuracy of detection depends on the manufacturer, and the 
specific activity concerned (Reichherzer et al., 2017; Torre et al., 2017). For example, 
Yoshigoe, Dai, Abramson, and Jacobs, (2016) demonstrated that a smart hub and its cloud 
server employed a predictable response pattern that can be used to identify when nobody is 




IoT devices also store and communicate large amounts of personal information, which can 
be used to build user profiles. Jacobsson et al., (2016) liken this to the current mapping of 
online user behaviour by companies including Facebook and Google but argues that the IoT 
will allow physical user habits to be plotted, creating detailed personal dossiers of both 
online and offline behaviour.  Companies may also profile to determine behavioural 
patterns for commercial purposes (e.g. Amin & Giacomoni, 2012) and to tailor unsolicited 
messages to users (Jacobsson et al., 2016).  Companies currently provide predictive insights 
about peoples’ health by tracking wearable and smartphone data to measure stress based 
on their heart rate, potentially revealing their (mental) health state (Aktypi et al., 2017).  
Data can be aggregated to make potentially sensitive inferences, such as participation in 
sporting events, while access to contact lists can allow inferences regarding health 
conditions and social activity (Aktypi et al., 2017).  These may constitute crimes under 
recently introduced General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) if adequate consent is not 
given or the data are processed inappropriately.  
 
Some papers discussed how profiling users could lead to discrimination using information 
gained from health wearables (Aktypi et al., 2017). Presently, the HR sector analyses job 
applicants’ suitability using information from social network accounts (CIPD, 2013).  In the 
future, information derived from IoT devices may be used to provide insight into applicant’s 
physical and mental health. For example, Aktypi et al., (2017) argue that obesity could be 
diagnosed using data from wearables and that pregnancy could be detected (resting heart 
rates increase by 40-50% during pregnancy).  The FTC (2015) also has concerns that the 
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collation of information about people may be used discriminately for employment, credit 
and insurance decisions. The legal implications of using social media data for employee 
screening are currently unclear (CIPD, 2013) but may be further clarified (in the UK at least) 
through recent data protection legislation (BBC news, 2017a; CIPD, 2013). However, the law 
on discrimination applies to both online and offline checks.  Thus, information gained 
regarding applicant’s protected characteristics that is misused to discriminate applicants will 
be illegal.  How data is collected from IoT devices is thus of concern. 
 
Several papers suggested that profiling could be used for reconnaissance to facilitate crimes 
including burglary (discussed further below) and stalking (Aktypi et al., 2017; Jacobsson et 
al., 2016).  Stalking is the repeated and persistent unwanted behaviour of an offender that 
engenders fear in victims (Paladin, 2018).  It is common in cases of domestic abuse 
(Coleman, 1997), and a review of domestic abuse-related homicides in London indicated 
that 40% of victims were stalked prior to their death (Metropolitan Police, 2003). Most 
cases of stalking already involve an online element (Laxton, 2014); however, attacks that 
exploit the IoT will allow stalking and related offenses to be committed with greater ease 
and in a more targeted way.   
 
Physical Access Control 
As discussed, occupancy detection can help offenders determine if a victim is home or not. 
Moreover, research has demonstrated that home security devices (e.g. connected door 
locks) can be exploited to allow unauthorised entry. For example, Ho et al. (2016) 
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demonstrated that an attacker (with previous authorised access) can evade both the 
revocation mechanisms (intended to prevent access by particular individuals) on smart locks 
and the access logging of such devices, giving them unlogged, unauthorized access to a 
home. This particular problem arises due to vulnerabilities in the network architectures 
used (e.g. the use of a Device-Gateway-Cloud architecture, where the device lacks a direct 
connection to the manufacturer’s servers) and access control policies used by a range of 
smart lock systems. Agadakos et al. (2017) showed that the interconnectedness of various 
devices (e.g. connected window sensors, smart plugs and smart hub) can also leave homes 
vulnerable. They demonstrated that the Bluetooth channel for a smart plug was 
unauthenticated, allowing attackers to use spoofing attacks to turn off the smart hub, 
rendering connected window sensors useless. In this case, homeowners would not be 
informed if windows were opened or closed.   
 
Other lab-based research (Wurm, Hoang, Arias, Sadeghi, & Jin, 2016) on smart home 
monitoring systems has identified vulnerabilities in the updating procedure, which can allow 
attackers to determine if users are home or not. Left unaddressed, as the consumer IoT 
market grows, this type of vulnerability may be significantly exploited—much like keyless 
car theft appears to be committed at the moment (BBC news, 2018). 
 
Fernandes, Rahmati, Jung, and Prakash (2017) argue that unnecessary access privileges, 
referred to as open privileges in smart home platforms, can leave devices vulnerable. For 
example, a malware app that uses privileges in the SmartThings platform can snoop on PIN 
codes as they are created and leak them, giving attackers the codes to unlock connected 
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doors. In a lab-based study, Min and Varadharajan (2015) demonstrate how attackers can 
exploit integration services (i.e. not just individual devices), including the popular IFTTT (If 
This Then That), that allows users to create triggers between devices or services (e.g. if light 
turned on, turn radio on). They show that attackers can take over a user’s IFTTT account 
through the theft of browser cookies and use malware to manipulate IFTTT triggers to 
perform unauthorised actions (e.g. triggering smart locks to open without alerting the user).  
 
A combination of occupancy detection and the exploitation of devices linked to physical 
security can facilitate unwanted intrusion in the home and burglaries. Numerous papers 
discuss how these mechanisms can be triggered (Fernandes et al., 2017; Fernandes, Jung, & 
Prakash, 2016; Ho et al., 2016; Oluwafemi, Kohno, Gupta, & Patel, 2013a), although they do 
not always demonstrate the attack, with experts speculating about the possibility instead 
(e.g. Aktypi et al., 2017).  
 
In the UK, the rate of domestic burglary has been declining with two in every 100 
households victim to domestic burglary in 2017 compared to nine in 1995 (Office for 
National Statistics, 2017c).  However, this has started to increase recently (Office for 
National Statistics, 2017a) and technology may further facilitate this if the vulnerabilities 
discussed go unaddressed.    
 
Control audio-visual outputs 
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Research demonstrates that attackers can manipulate and misuse devices, monitoring and 
controlling the audio/visual outputs of devices or misusing actuators.  For example, Bachy et 
al. (2015) exploited the firmware of Smart TVs using both physical and remote attacks, 
creating backdoor remote access to the TV from the internet. This allowed them to replace 
video displayed on the TV and use the device to launch additional attacks. Other lab-based 
studies have demonstrated that the visual output of surveillance cameras can be 
reconstructed by sniffing camera network traffic (Tekeoglu & Tosun, 2015b).  Moreover, due 
to a lack of encryption, images can be overwritten on many surveillance cameras using a 
video replay attack (Feng, Ye, Swaminathan, & Wei, 2017). As such, critical events may be 
hidden from the user (e.g. potential intruders) or misinformation communicated (E. 
Fernandes et al., 2017; Earlence Fernandes et al., 2016).  
 
Research by Obermaier and Hutle (2016) showed that using techniques including traffic 
analysis and firmware disassembly, attackers could exploit the poor encryption, 
authentication and access control of cameras. The success and consequences of attacks 
depended on the camera manufacturer and the attacker’s location (physical vs remote), but 
these vulnerabilities allowed the injection of forged video streams, manipulation of camera 
functionality, eavesdropping on camera streams, and the launch of attacks on the camera 
server. Xu et al. (2017) also demonstrated that cameras can be exploited in physical 
proximity attacks through access to cameras feed.  However, this type of attack requires 
physical access to the consumers’ smartphone to access the associated software 
application, or the theft of their sim card to reset the access password.  These studies 
demonstrate that some attacks are more sophisticated, require physical access to products 
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or connected devices, and that success may depend upon the specific vulnerabilities of the 
consumer device, but that these risks do exist.   
 
Other studies demonstrate that baby monitors are susceptible to hacking.  Sivaraman et al. 
(2015) show that man-in-the-middle attacks can facilitate access to camera feeds, allowing 
attackers to view children. Predators may also misuse IoT devices to groom and exploit 
children, or broadcast sexual content to them (Tzezana, 2016). Industry reports show that 
children’s toys are also susceptible to hacking, allowing strangers to talk to them (Which?, 
2017). The IoT may thus afford further opportunities for predators to gain access to 
children, in the same way that online social networking services have previously been 
misused (Mitchell, Finkelhor, Jones, & Wolak, 2010) – for example, Facebook has been used 
in 33% of cases involving the grooming of children (NSPCC, 2018).  
 
Consumer IoT devices can also be misused to illicit affective responses, causing 
embarrassment, annoyance or damaging a person’s reputation (Denning et al., 2009; E. 
Fernandes et al., 2017; Tzezana, 2017). For example, audio devices can record private 
conversations (Denning et al., 2009) and devices with cameras can take embarrassing or 
sexual photographs (Denning et al., 2009; Tzezana, 2017). Tzenana (2016) argues that 
various sex crimes could be committed using these devices. For example, offenders may 
broadcast sexual messages to victims, including children, conduct exhibitionism by 
displaying sexual images to victims, or engage in voyeurism by observing others for sexual 
relief. Internet-facilitated sexual offending is increasing and has resulted in a rise in 
26 
 
prosecutions and clinical referrals (Seto, 2015), but insecure IoT devices may fuel this type 
of offending further. 
 
Potential manipulation and misuse of devices 
Rahman, Carbunar, and Topkara (2013) demonstrated a number of security weaknesses of 
the Fitbit wearable. They were able to exploit a Fitbit within a radius of 15 feet and capture 
files including sensitive personal information (e.g. username, height, weight). They also 
found Fitbits to be susceptible to data integrity attacks allowing attackers to insert fake data 
without the Fitbit verifying it (e.g. unreasonable step counts). Step counts are linked to 
(monetary) rewards, which could allow attackers to earn money for steps (e.g. a $20 dollar 
gift card for steps accumulated) or appear higher on social ranking boards. They were also 
able to drain the battery of the device 21 times faster by continuously querying it. While 
these misdemeanours may not be particularly concerning, as devices become more 
connected and functionality increases, attacks may become more disconcerting. 
 
Other studies show that attackers can gain control of devices to (say) masquerade as a 
legitimate user to gain control of smart lightbulbs (Sivaraman et al., 2015), exploit RFIDs 
used on smart locks by emulating or cloning a tag to unlock them (Xu et al., 2017), or 
eavesdropping on device commands to enable remote access to motion switches 
(Sivaraman et al., 2015). However, it should be noted that not all IoT devices are vulnerable 
to attack.  For example, Visan, Lee, Yang, Smith, and Matson (2017) tested the security of 
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Samsung SmartThings and found it to be robust to various man-in-the-middle and DoS 
attacks.  
 
The manipulation of IoT devices may be used to cause denial of service or certain device 
functions. For example, offenders may use ransomware to lock household devices in 
exchange for cash (Bugeja et al., 2017) or disrupt their connectivity (e.g. Vemi & Panchev, 
2015).  More seriously, a number of consumer IoT devices in the home have safety critical 
monitoring functions (e.g. fire alarms) and offenders may suppress these (e.g. Coppolino, 
Dalessandro, Dantonio, Levy, & Romano, 2015). Furthermore, offenders may target devices 
with heating capabilities to cause arson in the home (Chen & Luo, 2012; Greensmith, 2015; 
Kang, Moon, & Park, 2017) or overload electrical devices such as lightbulbs (Oluwafemi et 
al., 2013b). Devices with actuators, including household robots, may be used to vandalise 
homes (Denning et al., 2009; E. Fernandes et al., 2017; Earlence Fernandes et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, consumer IoT devices may be used for political misuse, with smart assistants 
hacked to only communicate news from a particular political orientation (Tzezana, 2016).  
 
Of course, the IoT affords many benefits. For example, smart meters and the smart grid 
have the potential to achieve a more efficient, reliable way of providing gas and electricity 
to consumers (Smartgrid.gov, 2018). Of course, the security of this infrastructure is critical.  
Unfortunately, in the UK, the physical tampering of meters already costs consumers and the 
energy industry about £400 million per year (NPower, 2018).  Lo and Ansari (2013) argue 
that such offending may increase, with data integrity attacks used to inject malicious data 
into smart meters causing false usage results. In a series of studies, Liu and colleagues 
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simulated the impact of these attacks and demonstrated that an attacker can fake the 
guideline pricing curve (e.g. the cost of electricity during particular periods) and benefit 
from a 34% reduction in their bill. In another exploit, an attacker fakes the guideline pricing 
curve during peak load hours (e.g. 8pm) to be low so that significant energy can be 
consumed at discounted prices. They found that such attacks can significantly unbalance the 
local power system by increasing the peak to average ratio (in their study by 36%), which 
can lead to blackouts and a denial of service for energy usage, which has implications 
beyond energy theft.  
 
Gateway to further attacks 
As discussed, we did not examine the security of routers.  However, we did consider this in 
the context of the IoT.  Home routers are the gateway between connected devices and the 
internet, and in a Smart Home can help secure it. Research has shown that this sense of 
security may be overstated. Sivaraman, Chan, Earl, and Boreli (2016) were able to bypass 
the security in home routers through malware embedded on an iPhone app which scouts 
the users’ home network for IoT devices and relays this back to an attack server. The 
malicious app then configures port mappings on the home router (via Universal Plug and 
Play network protocols) to give the attacker server access to specific devices, which they can 
then attack.  
 
Others have demonstrated that they can exploit the connection between IoT devices and 
home routers. This often relies on physical proximity to the device, limiting the potential for 
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this kind of attack.  However, research has shown that this can be achieved using unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs).  For example, Vemi and Panchev (2015) were able to automate man-
in-the-middle attacks by flying UAVs around an area, setting up rogue access points and 
harvesting important credentials from wireless networks and connected devices. This 
allowed them to disconnect devices from home routers or launch DoS attacks (see also, Xu 
et al., 2017). Given increases in UAV sales (see Statistica, 2018), this type of attack becomes 
ever more plausible. 
DISCUSSION 
In recent decades, criminological research has focused on understanding the factors that 
facilitate crime and interventions that reduce it.  A variety of approaches have been taken, 
and frameworks developed.  The body of evidence continues to grow and there are now 
many systematic reviews of what works (e.g. see College of Policing, 2018).  While this is to 
be celebrated, for new forms of crime, including those (potentially) facilitated by the IoT, 
our knowledge of what works to reduce them is limited.  Given that at least half of all crime 
now occurs online, there is a clear need for criminologists to focus on these forms of 
offending to help better understand and address them.  The aim of this review was to 
systematically take stock of what we know and to map out a research agenda to encourage 
this. 
 
We found that consumer IoT devices can be exploited using a range of attack methods, 
which can facilitate a variety of offences.  We will not repeat what these are here.  However, 
it is worth noting that some offences may be more likely and affect more people than 
others.  For example, the exploitation of insecure IoT devices is likely to provide a wider 
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variety of opportunities for offenders to commit crimes such as stalking, and provide richer 
data for them to exploit.  For crimes including burglary, one might question if the IoT will 
increase this form of offending, since offenders already have ways of breaking into homes, 
and few may possess the necessary IT skills.   
 
However, this segues into a further question about emerging models of crime, particularly 
crime as a service (e.g. Manky, 2013).  In the context of cybercrime, an offender may not 
need the technical skills to commit a crime, as they can pay to use services provided by 
others.  Well-documented examples are DDoS attacks, which can be rented on the dark web 
for a few dollars (Kaspersky, 2017).  If the proliferation of IoT devices does increase the 
volume of crime opportunities, this will provide further incentives for those who provide 
such services, and for offenders to rent them.  In this context, as more people choose to 
connect their homes to the internet, crimes such as burglary might increasingly be 
committed through the exploitation of vulnerabilities in the IoT.  Critically assessing which 
crimes are most likely to be facilitated by the IoT would, thus, be a useful avenue for 
research. 
 
Considering scale, Williams (2017) conducted an assessment of the vulnerabilities of 
156,680 consumer IoT devices using the search engine Shodan.io. Thirteen-percent had 
vulnerabilities. Of these, 53% were printers, 40% were webcams and 7% were smart TVs.  
These numbers are non-trivial.  Moreover, it is worth noting that vulnerabilities in a single 




Apropos the research agenda, at least five themes are worthy of attention.  First, 
criminologists might explore the types of white-collar crime that could be facilitated.  They 
might consider how future legislation may make activities that are currently unregulated 
criminal.  For example, governments are introducing data protection legislation, and 
reacting to scandals associated with the inappropriate use of social media data.  A 
systematic analysis of how this landscape might/should change would thus be valuable. 
 
Third is measurement.  It is widely accepted that much crime goes unreported.  For 
computer misuse, the problem is likely to be considerably worse — data from the Crime 
Survey of England and Wales suggest that in the UK only 17% of offences are reported to 
Action Fraud, the UK’s national fraud and cyber-crime reporting centre.  While surveys can 
provide estimates of the prevalence of known offences, not all victims will be aware that 
they have been victimized and hence alternative data collection exercises will be required to 
estimate the true scale of the problem.   
 
Fourth is understanding the problem.  Research on situational crime prevention (SCP: 
Clarke, 1995) has sought to provide a detailed understanding of the conditions under which 
crime events occur, what kinds of targets are more vulnerable, and how crimes are carried 
out. The aim is to identify situational characteristics that might be manipulated to make 
crime less likely (e.g. Forrester, Chatterton, Pease, & Brown, 1988), and at what stage in a 
sequence of events interventions might best succeed.  Addressing such questions in the 
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context of the IoT may help to understand problems and identify solutions to 
them.  However, it will require detailed data, including the types of devices (and networks of 
them) that are most vulnerable, network configurations and so on.  Again, alternative forms 
of data collection will likely be required and collaborations with those in the field of 
information security are likely to be vital.  Some of the analytic tools used to understand 
urban crime problems might be repurposed, but new forms of analysis will also likely be 
required. 
 
In terms of crime prevention, we are currently exploring the potential of market levers to 
encourage manufacturers to make IoT devices secure by design (see Blythe and Johnson, 
2018, DCMS, 2018).  However, it will also be necessary to understand user behaviour as 
even the best designed system will fail if misused, misconfigured or updates are not 
installed. Non-compliance in the context of security is concerning but attackers are also 
known to target the human element (Mitnick & Simon, 2003). Understanding user 
susceptibility to cybercrimes will thus be important. Whilst much work needs to be done to 
ensure that the burden for securing IoT devices is reduced (DCMS, 2018), it is recognised 
that consumers will have to engage in “cyber hygiene” to maintain device security (Blythe, 
Michie, Watson, & Lefevre, 2017) and derived behavioural insights may be key to this 
(Coventry, Briggs, Blythe, & Tran, 2014). Firstly, what is needed is a greater focus on usable 
security to ensure the security of devices matches users’ goals, capabilities and primary 
tasks – recognising that security is secondary to consumers use of the product (Sasse, 2015). 
Secondly, crime prevention needs to focus on the facilitators and barriers to cyber hygiene, 
exploring users' capability, motivation and opportunity to protect themselves and design 
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interventions accordingly (e.g. Blythe & Coventry, 2018).  In a recent review, we found that 
cyberhygiene advice was absent in the user manuals or associated online materials of 90% 
of IoT devices sampled (Blythe et al, 2019).  
 
As with any research, this review is not without limitations.  Chief among these is that while 
developments in technology are rapid, the publication of academic research is not.  As such, 
we provide a snapshot of research that will need updating.  For example, it is possible that 
some of the vulnerabilities identified will have subsequently been fixed (for some or all 
devices) while others will be ongoing ‘unpatched’ issues.  Moreover, the systematic search 
did not include industry reports (although our other searches did).  Systematically searching 
these was beyond the scope of the current work but others might do this.  Another issue 
concerns differences in the vocabulary used across disciplines.  Research on cybersecurity 
typically focuses on threats to confidentiality, data integrity and availability as opposed to 
crime per se.  While we do not believe this hampered the review, it is an issue. 
 
At present, and as far as we are aware, we have not witnessed a wide-scale crime harvest 
associated with the IoT.  However, there is no room for complacency — crime harvests have 
played out time and again.  Now is the time to act and part of the aim of this paper was to 
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Table 1. Hierarchy of evidence 
Real world Paper demonstrates an attack/consequence implemented 
“in the wild” on real IT systems (e.g. an IoT device is 
remotely infected with malware in the real world) 
Experimental (lab-based) Paper demonstrates an attack/consequence in a lab-
based experiment using physical IT systems (e.g. an IoT 
device is infected with malware in a lab) 
Experimental (simulation) Paper demonstrates an attack/consequence in a 
computer-generated simulation (e.g. the effects of 
infecting IoT devices with malware are simulated in-silico) 
Expert speculative Data speculatively derived by a group of experts 
Author speculative Data speculatively derived by the study author  




Table 2. Summary of the key attacks against IoT devices identified 
DoS  Denial of Service (DoS) attacks prevent users from accessing individual 
or associated services (e.g. Aljosha et al., 2017).  They include jamming 
(e.g. Liu, Hu, & Ho, 2015) and flooding attacks (e.g. Thing, 2017), 
whereby a large volume of requests (e.g. for data or responses of some 
kind) are sent to a device (from a single source) with the aim of 
overwhelming it.  
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks (e.g. Lyu et al., 2017) aim 
to make services (e.g. websites) unavailable by overwhelming them 
with traffic from multiple sources (e.g. botnets).   
Eavesdropping Unauthorised interception of communications allows attackers to 
obtain information. It can be achieved directly through (say) sniffing 
attacks where an attacker captures network packets using an 
application to intercept data, (Vigo et al., 2012) or indirectly through 
(say) inference attacks, where the integration and correlation of known 
data about individuals can lead to the discovery of private data (e.g. 
Torre, Koceva, Sanchez, & Adorni, 2017).  
Malware Use of malicious software to compromise devices by exploiting 
soft/hardware vulnerabilities.  Exploits include changing the service 
purpose of the device (Kang et al., 2017).  For example, infected 
devices can be used to send spam email, launch further attacks (e.g. 
distribute ransomware) (Sivaraman et al., 2016) or steal information.   
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Man in the 
Middle attacks 
Attacker intercepts communications between devices, allowing them 
to eavesdrop, intercept, alter or steal information (e.g. Vemi & 
Panchev, 2015). 
Physical attacks Attacker physically accesses device to tamper with its hardware and 
settings (Snader, Kravets, & Harris  III, 2016).  
Data integrity 
attacks 
Attacker attempts to compromise data by inserting, modifying or 
deleting it (in storage or transmission). Includes replay attacks whereby 
information is captured and subsequently retransmitted (fraudulently) 
to trick receiver into completing unauthorized operations (e.g. Kumar 
et al., 2014), such as unlocking a smart lock.   
Spoofing attacks Attacker masquerades as another to steal information, spread 
malware, circumvent access controls or send unauthorised commands 
(e.g. Bugeja, Jacobsson, & Davidsson, 2017). 
Side channel 
attacks 
Exploits information gained or inferred from a device despite security 
existing (e.g. Srinivasan, Stankovic, & Whitehouse, 2008). Examples 
include monitoring the speed with which a device can encrypt data, or 




Attacker attempts to impersonate a user by using their access 
privileges. These may be obtained through social engineering attacks 
(e.g. Hoang & Pishva, 2015) or password guessing attacks (e.g. Wazid 























Information stored or shared on devices can be 
intercepted by attackers. This data can include 
sensitive data (e.g.  passwords, audio or visual 
information) or information pertaining to user 
behaviour and habits (e.g. fitness data). 
 [1]–[7]  [8] [9]–[12] [13] 
Profiling Attacker infers user activities (e.g. running, 
cooking, transport) and home occupation 
(in)directly from consumer IoT devices to 
potentially understand what they are doing at a 
particular time or to profile their behaviour.  
 [14]–[27] 
 
[28]  [29]–[35]  
Physical access 
control  
Attacker misuses devices linked to physical 




    
Manipulation of 
device (general) 
Attacker remotely controls and manipulates the 
device. For example, using actuators on 
household robots to cause damage to household 
property.  








Use of audio/visual outputs of IoT devices to 
control what the user hears/sees  
 [6], [42]–
[45] 





Malicious control or suppression of safety-
critical monitoring devices (e.g. fire alarms).  























Connected devices are linked to services in the 
home including critical (e.g. physical access, 
heating) and less critical (e.g. internet access) 
ones.  Exploitation can lead to denial of service 
for consumers or censorship of certain product 
functions. 






Exploitation of consumer IoT devices may allow 
attackers to listen and monitor user activities.  
 [7], [24], 
[42], [48] 






Once devices are exploited, attackers may use 
the device or information gained from it to 
launch additional attacks. For example, using a 
device as part of a Botnet to launch DDoS 
attacks, or using personal information for 
targeted password guessing. 




[1] Bojinov, Bursztein, and Boneh (2009); [2] Lee, Lee, Shim, Cho, and Choi (2016);  [3] Min and Varadharajan (2016); [4] Tang et al. (2017);  [5] Tekeoglu and Tosun (2015); [6] Tekeoʇlu and Tosun (2015);  [7] 
Lotfy and Hale (2016); [8] Tzezana (2016); [9] Bugeja (2017); [10] DeMarinis and Fonseca (2017);  [11]  Ahmad, Sunshine, Kaestner, and Wynne (2015); [12] Hoang and Pishva (2015); [13] Winter (2015); [14] 
Copos, Levitt, Bishop, and Rowe (2016); [15] Fafoutis, Marchegiani, Papadopoulos, Piechocki, Tryfonas, and Oikonomou (2017); [16] He, Xiao, He, and Pathan (2017); [17] Park, C. Basaran, Park, and Son 
(2014); [18] Reichherzer, Timm, Earley, Reyes, and Kumar (2017); [19] Sanchez et al. (2014), [20] Snader, Kravets, and Harris (2016); [21] Srinivasan, Stankovic, and Whitehouse (2008a); [22] Srinivasan, 
Stankovic, and Whitehouse (2008b); [23] Chen, Kalra, Irwin, Shenoy, and Albrecht (2015); [24] Schurgot, Shinberg, and Greenwald (2015); [25] Anand and Saxena (2016); [26] Yoshigoe, Dai, Abramson, and 
Jacobs (2016); [27] Das, Pathak, Chuah, and Mohapatra (2016); [28] Torre, Koceva, Sanchez, and Adorni (2017); [29] Aktypi, Nurse, and Goldsmith (2017); [30] Amin and Giacomoni (2012); [31] Aouini and 
Azzouz (2015); [32] Bergmann, Gerdes, Schafer, Junge, and Bormann (2012); [33] Kermani, Zhang, Raghunathan, and Jha (2013); [34] Greensmith (2015); [35] Brauchli and Li (2015); [36] Ho, Leung, Mishra, 
Hosseini, Song, and Wagner (2016); [37] Agadakos et al. (2017); [38] Fernandes, Rahmati, Jung, and Prakash (2017); [39] Oluwafemi, Kohno, Gupta, and Patel (2013); [40] Denning, Matuszek, Koscher, Smith, 
and Kohno (2009); [41] Ganguly, Poddar, Dutta, and Nasipuri (2016); [42] Obermaier and Hutle (2016); [43] Bachy et al. (2015); [44] Feng, Ye, Swaminathan, and Wei (2017); [45] Xu, Sgandurra, Mayes, Li, and 
Wang (2017); [46] Kumar, Gurtov, Iinatti, Ylianttila, and Sain (2016); [47] Coppolino, Dalessandro, Dantonio, Levy, and Romano (2015); [48] Vemi and Panchev (2015); [49] Al Delail and Yeun (2016); [50] 
Jacobsson, Boldt, and Carlsson (2016); [51] Arabo (2015); [52] Mosenia, Sur-Kolay, Raghunathan, and Jha (2017); [53] Murillo (2016); [54] Vigo, Yuksel, and Dewi Puspa Kencana Ramli (2012); [55] Rehman and 
Manickam (2016); [56] Lyu, Sherratt, Sivanathan, Gharakheili, Radford, and Sivaraman (2017) 
*excludes papers that only discuss attack vectors such as Denial of service and eavesdropping attacks without consideration of the harms that 
arise from attacks.  
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Table 4. Cybercrimes/harms and hierarchy of evidence (citations shown in square brackets) 
Cybercrimes/harms 
 













Energy theft  Attacker misuses smart meters or other 
consumer IoT devices to steal electricity, 
increase utility costs to victims, manipulate 
energy costs in distribution networks, 
impact smart grid network or cause 
blackouts. 
 [1], [2] [3]–[10]  [11]–[19]  
Burglary Information from devices can reveal 
household occupancy based on user 
activities (see profiling). Further 
exploitation of connected devices (e.g. 
smart locks) can allow attackers to gain 
physical entry.  
 [20]–
[24] 






Sex crimes Use of consumer IoT devices to facilitate 
sex-related crimes such as stealing sex-
related videos, sexual assault, obscenity, 
exhibitionism, and voyeurism.  
   [25], [32]   
Political Exploiting consumer IoT devices for 
political gains (e.g. political subjugation 
and control, and propaganda). 
   [25], [32]   
Identity theft Stealing sensitive personal information 
from devices to commit identity fraud.  
   [32] [11], [27], 
[30] 
 
Harm to inhabitants Causing physical or mental harm to 
individuals including vulnerable groups 
(e.g. children and older adults) that may be 
susceptible to nefarious influence. For 






















example, targeting devices with heating 
capabilities to cause a fire in the home 
Misinformation Use of IoT devices to give false or 
inaccurate information (e.g. false fire 
alarms). 
    [23], [24]  
Financial losses 
(general) 
Financial losses arising from exploitation of 
IoT devices 







Use of information from IoT for targeted 
advertising and marketing  
    [27], [30]  
Blackmail  Use of information gained from IoT devices 
to blackmail individuals 
   [25], [32] [14], [39]  
Vandalism Damage to physical property or household 
objects arising from exploited devices with 
actuators 





Use of information gained from IoT devices 
to cause embarrassment, annoyance or 
damage reputations  
    [23], [32], 
[35] 
 
Discrimination Misuse of information from IoT devices 
(e.g. beliefs, health information) to 
discriminate against individuals  
    [18], [27]  
Stalking Use of information gained from IoT devices 
(e.g. location) to stalk victims  
    [27], [30]  
[1] Ganguly, Poddar, Dutta, and Nasipuri (2016); [2] Tweneboah-Koduah, Skouby, and Tadayoni (2017); [3] Lo and Ansari (2013); [4] Liu, Hu, and Ho (2015); [5] Liu et al. (2015); [6] Liu and Hu (2015); [7] Liu, 
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